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Abstract
In the present paper, the Polyak’s principle, concerning convexity of the images of small balls through
C1,1 mappings, is employed in the study of vector optimization problems. This leads to extend to such a
context achievements of local programming, an approach to nonlinear optimization, due to B.T. Polyak,
which consists in exploiting the benefits of the convex local behaviour of certain nonconvex problems. In
doing so, solution existence and optimality conditions are established for localizations of vector optimization
problems, whose data satisfy proper assumptions. Such results are subsequently applied in the analysis of
welfare economics, in the case of an exchange economy model with infinite-dimensional commodity space.
In such a setting, the localization of an economy yields existence of Pareto optimal allocations, which, under
certain additional assumptions, lead to competitive equilibria.
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1 Introduction
In a series of papers appeared at the beginnings of the current millennium (see [20, 21, 22]), the term “local pro-
gramming” was used to denote the theory emerging in connection with a special class of nonlinear optimization
problems. This class includes mathematical programming problems, with equality and inequality constraints,
that, even in the absence of convexity assumptions on their data, surprisingly do exhibit a local behaviour,
which is typical of convex optimization problems. The doubtless advantages arising when one handles problems
with convex data should underline the importance of local programming. The unexpected appearance of a local
convex behaviour within the “ocean of nonlinear optimization” has a deep reason, resting upon the Polyak’s
convexity principle. This crucial achievement of modern nonlinear analysis states, in its original formulation,
that a mapping between Hilbert spaces, which is C1,1 around a regular point, carries balls centered at that point
to convex sets, provided that the radius of the balls is small enough. In many questions related to optimization,
it is already the convexity of images of sets, not only that of the involved functions, which does the trick, with a
lot of proficuous consequences. Then reason why C1,1 smoothness of a mapping along with its regularity should
imply convexity of the image of balls is even deeper, having to do with profound geometric properties of the
underlying space and with the preservation of convexity through linear approximations.
In the present paper, such a ultimate reason is left at that. Instead, the main theme is the extension of the
local programming approach to vector optimization. In fact, also in such context, a class of nonlinear problems
can be singled out, whose local convex behaviour bear interesting consequences. The study of them is carried
out in a general setting. Constrained vector optimization problems will be supposed to be defined in a proper
subclass of reflexive Banach spaces. Nonetheless, some of the findings that are going to be presented here seem
to be novel even for finite-dimensional problems.
The material exposed in the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, key concepts and results from
nonlinear analysis, essentially employed in subsequent investigations, are recalled, along with the most part of
the notation in use throughout the paper. Section 3 contains the main result of the paper, describing the effect
of localizing problems in nonlinear vector optimization. It deals, in particular, with existence of solutions and
optimality conditions for detecting them. Section 4 is reserved for an application of the main result to a topic
of mathematical economics, known as welfare theory. More precisely, a model of (pure) exchange economy,
with an infinite-dimensional commodity space and finitely many consumers, is considered. In such model, the
existence of Pareto optimal allocations, which, under an adequate qualification, turn out to be also equilibria,
for proper localizations of the original economy is obtained.
2 Mathematical preliminaries
Throughout the paper, whenever (X, ‖ ·‖) denotes a Banach space, B(x; r) denotes the ball with centre at x ∈ X
and radius r ≥ 0. The null vector of a Banach space is marked by 0. The unit ball, i.e. the set B(0; 1), is simply
denoted by B, whereas the unit sphere by S. If S is a subset of a Banach space, intS, bdS and clS denote
the interior, the boundary and the (topological) closure of S, respectively. Fixed x ∈ S, N (S;x) denotes the
normal cone to S at x in the sense of convex analysis.
For the purposes of the present analysis, general Banach spaces are a setting too wide. In fact, the main
result presented in this paper and its application essentially rely on certain geometrical features of a specific
class of Banach spaces, features that are related to the rotundity of the balls. The rotundity property of a
Banach space (X, ‖ · ‖) can be quantitatively described by means of the function δX : [0, 2] −→ [0, 1], defined by
δX(ǫ) = inf
{
1−
∥∥∥∥x1 + x22
∥∥∥∥ : x1, x2 ∈ B, ‖x1 − x2‖ ≥ ǫ
}
,
which is called the modulus of convexity of (X, ‖ ·‖). Notice that δX is not invariant under equivalent renormings
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of X. Such notion allows one to define a special class of Banach spaces, whose introduction is due to J.A.
Clarkson (see, for instance, [5, 9, 14]).
Definition 2.1. A Banach space (X, ‖ · ‖) is called uniformly convex (or, uniformly rotund) if it is δX(ǫ) > 0 for
every ǫ ∈ (0, 2].
In what follows, the modulus of convexity of a (uniformly convex) Banach space is said to fulfil the quadratic
growth condition if there exists κ > 0 such that
δX(ǫ) ≥ κǫ
2, ∀ǫ ∈ [0, 2].
The class of uniformly convex Banach spaces, with modulus of convexity fulfilling the quadratic growth condition,
reveals to be the proper setting, in which to develp the analysis of the question under consideration.
Example 2.1. (i) Since the modulus of convexity of a Hilbert space H can be easily calculated to be
δH(ǫ) = 1−
√
1−
ǫ2
4
, ∀ǫ ∈ [0, 2],
it is clear that every Hilbert space is uniformly convex, with a modulus of convexity fulfilling the quadratic
growth condition with 0 < κ ≤ 1/8.
(ii) More generally, such Banach spaces as lp, Lp, and W pm, with 1 < p < 2, are known to have a modulus
of convexity satisfying the relation
δlp(ǫ) = δLp(ǫ) = δWpm(ǫ) >
p− 1
8
ǫ2, ∀ǫ ∈ (0, 2].
Therefore, they also are an example of uniformly convex space with a modulus of convexity satisfying the
quadratic growth condition (see, for instance, [9]).
(iii) Concerning the notion of uniform convexity, a caveat is due: even finite-dimensional Banach spaces may
fail to be uniformly convex. Consider, for instance, R2 equipped with the Banach space structure given by the
norm ‖ · ‖∞.
Remark 2.1. (i) In [19] it was proved that the modulus of convexity δX of every real Banach space, having
dimension greater than 1, admits the following estimate from above
δX(ǫ) ≤ 1−
√
1−
ǫ2
4
, ∀ǫ ∈ [0, 2].
This implies that the quadratic growth is a maximal one.
(ii) In the sequel, the fact will be used that every uniformly convex Banach space is reflexive. In the Banach
space theory, such result is known under the name of Milman-Pettis theorem (see [14]). It is worth mentioning
that uniform convexity is not characterized by reflexivity. Indeed, in [6] a large class of reflexive (separable and
strictly convex) Banach spaces is exhibited, which are not isomorphic to uniformly convex spaces.
(iii) Let (X, ‖·‖) be a uniformly convex Banach space, with a modulus of convexity δX fulfilling the quadratic
growth condition, and n ∈ N. As a consequence of Theorem 5.2.25 in [14], the space (Xn, ‖ · ‖2), where the
direct sum space Xn = X⊕ . . .⊕ X is normed with the 2-norm ‖ · ‖2 : X
n −→ [0,+∞)
‖(x1, . . . , xn)‖2 =
(
n∑
i=1
‖xi‖
2
)1/2
,
is a uniformly convex space.
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Another key concept, playing a crucial role in this paper, is openness at a linear rate, a property for mappings,
which postulates a certain quantitative surjectivity behaviour. More precisely, a mapping f : X −→ Y between
Banach spaces is said to be open at a linear rate around (x0, f(x0)), with x0 ∈ X, if there exist positive δ, ζ and
σ such that
f(B(x; r)) ⊇ B(f(x);σr) ∩ B(f(x0); ζ), ∀x ∈ B(x0; δ), ∀r ∈ [0, δ). (1)
Clearly, inclusion (1) has crucial consequences on the local solvability of the equation f(x) = y as well as on
the Lipschitz behaviour of its solution set f−1(y) near x0. So, it comes not surprising that many efforts have
been directed to find out criteria able to detect the occurence of such a property. The following result, known
in nonlinear analsysis as Lyusternik-Graves theorem, provides a characterization of openness at a linear rate for
strictly differentiable mappings (see, for instance, Theorem 1.57 in [17]). Throughout the paper, the Fre´chet
derivative at x ∈ X of a mapping f : X −→ Y between Banach spaces is denoted by Df(x).
Theorem 2.1. Let f : X −→ Y be a mapping between Banach spaces. Suppose f to be strictly differentiable at
x0 ∈ X. Then f is open at a linear rate around (x0, f(x0)) iff Df(x0) is onto.
For the analysis conducted in the present paper, strict differentiability will be not enough. Instead, in the
main result, mappings will be supposed to be C1,1. Recall that a mapping f : X −→ Y between Banach spaces
is said to be C1,1(Ω), with Ω being an open subset of X, if it admits Fre´chet derivative at x, for every x ∈ Ω,
and the mapping Df : Ω −→ L(X,Y) is Lipschitz continuous on Ω, where L(X,Y) stands for the Banach space
of all linear bounded mappings between X and Y, equipped with the operator norm. In the special case Y = R,
the symbol L(X,Y) is replaced by X∗. Given x∗ ∈ X∗, its kernel is denoted by kerx∗.
The main tool of analysis in the subsequent section will be the Polyak’s convexity principle. It states
that C1,1 mappings, which are open at a linear rate around a given point, carry small balls centered at that
point to convex sets. This important result was originally established for mappings between Hilbert spaces
(see [20, 21, 22]) and, later on, it was extended to mappings defined on uniformly convex Banach spaces, with
modulus of convexity fulfilling the quadratic growth condition (see [23]). In order to give the present analysis a
proper level of generality, motivated by applications to models of welfare economics exposed in the last section,
the Polyak’s convexity principle is below formulated in its most recent version.
Theorem 2.2. Let f : X −→ Y be a mapping between Banach spaces, let Ω be an open subset of X, let x0 ∈ Ω,
and r > 0 such that B(x0; r) ⊆ Ω. Suppose that:
(i) (X, ‖ · ‖) is uniformly convex with modulus δX satisfying the quadratic growth condition;
(ii) f ∈ C1,1(Ω) and Df(x0) ∈ L(X,Y) is onto.
Then, there exists ǫ0 ∈ (0, r) such that f(B(x0; ǫ)) is convex, for every ǫ ∈ [0, ǫ0].
Remark 2.2. The following complement of Theorem 2.2, already remarked in [20], will be exploited in the
sequel. From hypothesis (ii) and Theorem 2.1, one has that f(intB(x0; ǫ)) ⊆ int f(B(x0; ǫ)) 6= ∅, for every
ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0]. Therefore, it holds
f−1(bd f(B(x0; ǫ))) ⊆ bdB(x0; ǫ).
3 A localization property in vector optimization
Consider a vector optimization problem of the following form:
(VOP) K-max
x∈X
h(x) subject to g(x) ∈ C,
where h : X −→ W and g : X −→ Y are given mappings, C is a nonempty subset of Y and K ⊆ W is a closed,
convex and pointed cone (with apex at the null vector of W). Here (X, ‖ · ‖), (W, ‖ · ‖) and (Y, ‖ · ‖) are real
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Banach spaces. Besides, W is supposed to be partially ordered by K in the canonical way, namely K induces a
partial order relation ≤K over elements of W as follows
w1 ≤K w2 iff w2 − w1 ∈ K.
In other terms, K can be regarded as the positive cone with respect to a partial ordering ≤K defined on W.
By K⊕ = {w∗ ∈ W∗ : 〈w∗, w〉 ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ K} the positive dual cone of K is denoted. The feasible region
associated with (VOP) is indicated by
R = {x ∈ X : g(x) ∈ C} = g−1(C).
Recall that x¯ ∈ R is said to be locally K-optimal for (or a local solution to) (VOP) if there exists r > 0 such
that
h(R ∩ B(x¯; r)) ∩ (h(x¯) +K) = {h(x¯)}.
Of course, if in the above equality B(x¯; r) can be replaced by X, x¯ is also globally K-optimal for (VOP).
According to a longstanding approach, in order to investigate optimization problems of the form (VOP),
given an element x¯ ∈ R it is convenient to associate with such problem the mapping IVOPx¯ : X −→ W × Y,
defined by
IVOPx¯ (x) = (h(x) − h(x¯), g(x)). (2)
By means of such mapping, letting
Q = (K\{0})× C,
one is in a position to formulate the following set characterization of local K-optimality.
Proposition 3.1. An element x¯ ∈ R is a local solution to (VOP) iff there exists r > 0 such that
IVOPx¯ (B(x¯; r)) ∩ Q = ∅.
Proof. The proof stems directly from the definition of IVOPx¯ and from the aforementioned notion of local K-
optimality.
Within the context of vector optimization, the issue addressed in this section deals with the local behaviour
of (VOP) near certain reference points of its feasible region. The approach here proposed leads to introduce
the concept of problem localization. Let x0 ∈ R and ǫ > 0. By ǫ-localization of (VOP) around x0 the following
problem is meant
(VOPx0,ǫ) K- max
x∈B(x0;ǫ)
h(x) subject to g(x) ∈ C
The reader should notice that, because B(x0; ǫ) is closed, (VOPx0,ǫ) actually contains a further constraint. Its
introduction may change substantially the geometry of the problem.
In order to investigate the effect of localizing vector optimization, the next general proposition is needed,
which shows how openness at a linear rate of IVOPx0 can not be consistent with the K-optimality of a feasible
element x0 ∈ R.
Proposition 3.2. With reference to a problem (VOP), let x0 ∈ R. If mapping IVOPx0 is open at a linear rate
near (x0, (0, g(x0))), then x0 fails to be a solution to (VOPx0,ǫ), for every ǫ > 0.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary ǫ > 0. By hypothesis, according to (1) there exist positive δ, ζ and σ such that
IVOPx0 (B(x; r)) ⊇ B(I
VOP
x0 (x);σr) ∩ B((0, g(x0)); ζ), ∀x ∈ B(x0; δ), ∀r ∈ [0, δ). (3)
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Thus, by taking x = x0 and r such that
0 < r < min
{
ǫ,
ζ
σ
}
,
one finds
IVOPx0 (B(x0; r)) ⊇ B((0, g(x0));σr).
Since r < ǫ and B((0, g(x0));σr) ∩ Q 6= ∅, the last inclusion entails
IVOPx0 (B(x0; r)) ∩ Q 6= ∅,
what excludes that x0 is K-optimal for (VOPx0,ǫ), according to Proposition 3.1.
Now, the analysis is focussed on the subclass of those elements x0 ∈ R, such that IVOPx0 is open at a
linear rate near (x0, (0, g(x0))). If assuming the data h and g to be at least strictly differentiable at x0, by
virtue of Theorem 2.1 the surjectivity condition on D(h, g)(x0) singles out points at which IVOPx0 is open at
a linear rate. These points, while being not solution to (VOP), nevertheless turn out to enjoy an interesting
property. Indeed, whenever the Polyak’s convexity principle can be invoked, the ǫ-localization of (VOP) around
them, for ǫ sufficently small, reveal to do admit a solution, which can be detected by a method proper of
convex optimization, i.e. via an optimality condition stating the maximality of such solution for the Lagrangian
function. Here, by Lagrangian function associated with (VOP), the classical function L : W∗ × Y∗ × X −→ R,
defined by
L(w∗, y∗;x) = 〈w∗, h(x)〉 + 〈y∗, g(x)〉,
is meant. This localization property is fomulated in the next result.
Theorem 3.1. With reference to (VOP), let Ω ⊆ X open, C ⊆ Y a nonempty, closed and convex set, and
x0 ∈ Ω ∩R. Suppose that:
(i) (X, ‖ · ‖) is uniformly convex with modulus δX satisfying the quadratic growth condition;
(ii) (W, ‖ · ‖) and (Y, ‖ · ‖) are reflexive Banach spaces;
(iii) h, g ∈ C1,1(Ω) and D(h, g)(x0) ∈ L(X,W× Y) is onto.
Then, there exists ǫ0 > 0 such that for every ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0] there are xǫ ∈ bdB(x0; ǫ) and (w
∗
ǫ , y
∗
ǫ ) ∈ (W
∗ ×
Y∗)\{(0∗,0∗)} such that
xǫ is a global solution to (VOPx0,ǫ); (4)
w∗ǫ ∈ K
⊕\{0∗}, −y∗ǫ ∈ N(g(xǫ);C) ; (5)
L(w∗ǫ , y
∗
ǫ ;xǫ) ≥ L(w
∗
ǫ , y
∗
ǫ ;x), ∀x ∈ B(x0; ǫ). (6)
Proof. Consider the mapping IVOPx¯ as defined in (2), with x¯ = x0. Under the assumptions made, it is IVOPx0 ∈
C1,1(Ω) and DIVOPx0 (x0) = D(h, g)(x0) is onto. By virtue of hypothesis (i) it is possible to invoke the Polyak’s
convexity principle (Theorem 2.2). According to it, there exists ǫ0 > 0 such that IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)) is a convex
closed set with nonempty interior, for every ǫ ∈ [0, ǫ0]. Notice that, since IVOPx0 is continuous at x0, then without
loss of generality one can assume the set IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)) to be also bounded. Now, fix any ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0]. Let us
denote by ΠW : W × Y −→ W the projection operator on the space W. Define wˆ as one of the K-minimal
element of the set
ΠW(IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ) ∩ (K × C)).
6
Let us show that such definition makes sense, that is wˆ does actually exist. Since DIVOPx0 (x0) is onto, x0 can
not be a local solution to (VOP). According to Proposition 3.1 it must be
IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)) ∩ Q 6= ∅
and hence
IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)) ∩ (K × C) 6= ∅.
Observe that, IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)) being convex and closed, it is also weakly closed. As the spaceW×Y is reflexive by
hypothesis (ii), IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)), which is also bounded, turns out to be weakly compact. Since K ×C is convex
and closed, it is also weakly closed. Thus, it is possible to deduce that the nonempty set (IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ))∩(K×C)
is weakly compact. On the other hand, the projection mapping ΠW is weakly continuous onW×Y. This enables
one to conclude that the image of IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ) ∩ (K ×C) through ΠW is weakly compact. Then, by virtue of
a well-known existence result for vector optimization problems (see, for instance, Theorem 6.5(a) in [12]), there
must exists wˆ ∈ ΠW(IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)) ∩ (K ×C)), which is K-maximal. Now, take any element (wˆ, yˆ) ∈ Π
−1
W
(wˆ).
Corresponding to such a (wˆ, yˆ), there exists xǫ ∈ B(x0; ǫ) with the property
wˆ = h(xǫ)− h(x0), yˆ = g(xǫ).
Notice that, being (wˆ, yˆ) ∈ IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)) ∩ (K × C)), it is xǫ ∈ B(x0; ǫ) ∩R. Let us prove that xǫ verifies the
first assertion in the thesis. Ab absurdo, assume that x˜ ∈ B(x0; ǫ) ∩R can be found such that
h(x˜) ∈ (h(xǫ) +K)\{h(xǫ)}.
This means that for some k˜ ∈ K\{0} is has to be
h(x˜) = h(xǫ) + k˜,
whence
h(x˜)− h(xǫ) ∈ K\{0}.
Thus, one obtains
h(x˜)− h(x0) = h(x˜)− h(xǫ) + h(xǫ)− h(x0) ∈ wˆ +K, (7)
with h(x˜)− h(x0) 6= wˆ. It follows from (7) that the K-maximality of wˆ is violated. Indeed, it is
(h(x˜)− h(x0), g(x˜)) ∈ IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)) ∩ (K × C),
because h(x˜)− h(x0) ∈ wˆ +K ⊆ K and g(x˜) ∈ C.
Observe that the K-maximality of wˆ entails that wˆ ∈ bdΠW(IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)) ∩ (K × C)) and this fact, in
turn, entails that (wˆ, yˆ) ∈ bd (IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)) ∩ (K × C)). Therefore, (wˆ, yˆ) must belong to the boundary of
at least one of the two subsets, IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)) or K × C. If it were (wˆ, yˆ) ∈ int I
VOP
x0 (B(x0; ǫ)), it would exist
kˆ ∈ K\{0} such that (wˆ + kˆ, yˆ) ∈ IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)). Since (wˆ + kˆ, yˆ) ∈ K × C, this would be inconstistent with
the K-maximality of wˆ. So one can conclude that (wˆ, yˆ) ∈ bd IVOPx0 (B(x0; ǫ)). Then, according to what noticed
in Remark 2.2, xǫ must belong to bdB(x0; ǫ). By using again the characterization of K-optimality for problem
(VOPx0,ǫ), one obtains
IVOPxǫ (B(x0; ǫ)) ∩ Q = ∅.
From the definition of mapping IVOPxǫ one can readily see that it holds
IVOPxǫ (x) = I
VOP
x0 (x) + (h(x0)− h(xǫ),0), ∀x ∈ X.
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Therefore, as a mere translation of a convex, closed set with nonempty interior (remember Remark 2.2), also
IVOPxǫ (B(x0; ǫ)) has such properties. Being disjoint from Q, it can be linearly separated from clQ = K × C, by
virtue of the Eidelheit’s theorem. This means that there exists (w∗ǫ , y
∗
ǫ ) ∈ (W
∗×Y∗)\{(0∗,0∗)} and α ∈ R such
that
〈w∗ǫ , h(x)− h(xǫ)〉+ 〈y
∗
ǫ , g(x)〉 ≤ α, ∀x ∈ B(x0; ǫ), (8)
and
〈w∗ǫ , w〉 + 〈y
∗
ǫ , y〉 ≥ α, ∀(w, y) ∈ K × C. (9)
If x = xǫ, from inequality (8) one gets
〈y∗ǫ , g(xǫ)〉 ≤ α.
On the other hand, being (0, g(xǫ)) ∈ K × C, from inequality (9) one has
〈y∗ǫ , g(xǫ)〉 ≥ α,
whence
〈y∗ǫ , g(xǫ)〉 = α. (10)
As for every y ∈ C it is (0, y) ∈ K × C, one has
〈y∗ǫ , y〉 ≥ α,
whence it results in
〈y∗ǫ , y − g(xǫ)〉 ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ C. (11)
This entails that −y∗ǫ ∈ N(g(xǫ);C). To complete the proof of (5), take an arbitrary w ∈ K. Being (w, g(xǫ)) ∈
K × C, from (9) one gets
〈w∗ǫ , w〉 ≥ 0,
that is w∗ǫ ∈ K
⊕. To show that w∗ǫ 6= 0
∗, assume instead that w∗ǫ = 0
∗. By the open covering property of g
around (x0, g(x0)), which is a consequence of the surjectivity of Dg(x0), it holds
g(B(x0; r)) ⊇ B(g(x0);σr)
for proper positive σ and r < ǫ. In the light of (8) this yields
〈y∗ǫ , g(x0) + ηu〉 ≤ α, ∀u ∈ S, ∀η ∈ [0, σr),
whereas, by inequality (9), the inclusion (0, g(xǫ)) ∈ K × C implies
〈y∗ǫ , g(x0)〉 ≥ α.
Consequently, one finds
η〈y∗ǫ , u〉 ≤ α− 〈y
∗
ǫ , g(x0)〉 ≤ 0, ∀u ∈ S,
which evidently contradicts the fact that y∗ǫ 6= 0
∗ (remember that (w∗ǫ , y
∗
ǫ ) ∈W
∗ × Y∗\{(0∗,0∗)}).
To conclude the proof it suffices to observe that (6) is a straightforward consequence of inequality (8) and
of (10). This completes the proof.
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Remark 3.1. (i) In view of a subsequent application of Theorem 3.1, it is to be noted that, whenever set C is,
in particular, a cone with apex at the null vector of Y, then the thesis of the theorem can be refined by adding
that
y∗ǫ ∈ {g(xǫ)}
⊥.
To see this, it suffices to put y = 2g(xǫ) and then y = 0 in inequality (11), which is valid all over C.
(ii) A remarkable feature of Theorem 3.1 is that the multiplier w∗ǫ , corresponding to the solution to (VOPx0,ǫ),
does not vanish.
(iii) Theorem 3.1 extends to the context of vector optimization Theorem 4.1 in [20]. Nevertheless, as it
is possible to show by means of easy counterexamples, the uniqueness of the solution to ǫ-localizations of the
problem, which is valid in scalar optimization, can not be restored in such extension.
As a comment to Theorem 3.1 it is worth noting that its thesis relates to two different issues arising in
the study of optimization problems. The first one has to do with the existence of solution to ǫ-localizations
of the original problem. Whereas the solution existence for localizations comes out automatically in the case
of finite-dimensional problems, because h and g are locally continuous around x0 and B(x0; ǫ) is compact, the
question becomes subtler when X is infinite-dimensional. In such circumstance, indeed, B(x0; ǫ) turns out to
be weakly compact as X is reflexive, but h may fail to be weakly continuous, in the absence of any convexity
assumption, and, for a similar reason, R = g−1(C) may fail to be weakly closed. It is at that point that one
appreciates the power of the Polyak’s convexity principle. The second aspect is relevant independently of the
dimension of the underlying space. It deals with the necessary optimality condition, which turns out to hold
at a solution to a ǫ-localization of (VOP). It is well known that standard optimality conditions for problems
with smooth data can only prescribe stationarity for the Lagrangian function associated with the problem, in
the absence of convexity assumptions. In contrast with this, resting upon the Polyak’s principle, Theorem 3.1
guarantees the maximality of solutions also for the Lagrangian function, for a proper choice of multipliers.
Again note that, as it typically happens in convex optimization, conditions (5) and (6) appearing in Theorem
3.1 are almost a characterization of K-optimality for problem (VOPx0,ǫ). In other terms, any element of
R∩B(x0; ǫ) satisfying condition (6) and an enforcement of condition (5) can be shown to solve (VOPx0,ǫ). This
is done below.
Proposition 3.3. Under the same hypotheses of Theorem 3.1, in the same notations, let ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0] and
z ∈ B(x0; ǫ). If there exists (w
∗, y∗) ∈ (W∗ × Y∗)\{(0∗,0∗)} fulfilling the following conditions:
w∗ ∈ K⊕, kerw∗ = {0}, and − y∗ ∈ N(g(z);C) , (12)
and
L(w∗, y∗; z) ≥ L(w∗, y∗;x), ∀x ∈ B(x0; ǫ), (13)
then z is a solution to (VOPx0,ǫ).
Proof. Take an arbitrary x ∈ R ∩ B(x0; ǫ). Being g(x) ∈ C, by virtue of the third relation in (12), one has
〈y∗, g(x)− g(z)〉 ≥ 0.
Therefore, from inequality (13) it follows
〈w∗, h(z)〉 ≥ 〈w∗, h(x)〉 + 〈y∗, g(x)− g(z)〉 ≥ 〈w∗, h(x)〉, ∀x ∈ R ∩ B(x0; ǫ),
whence
〈w∗, h(z)− h(x)〉 ≥ 0, , ∀x ∈ R ∩ B(x0; ǫ). (14)
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Now, assume ab absurdo that z fails to be a solution to (VOPx0,ǫ). Then, there must exists xˆ ∈ R ∩ B(x0; ǫ)
such that
h(xˆ) ∈ (h(z) +K)\{h(z)}, (15)
and hence
h(xˆ)− h(z) ∈ K\{0}.
Consequently, since it is w∗ ∈ K⊕, one finds
〈w∗, h(xˆ)− h(z)〉 ≥ 0,
which, along with inequality (14), implies
〈w∗, h(xˆ)− h(z)〉 = 0.
In the light of the condition in (12) on the triviality of kerw∗, the last equality allows one to conclude that
h(xˆ) = h(z), what contradicts inclusion (15). Thus the proof is complete.
4 An application to welfare economics
4.1 The economic model
This section is concerned with a model of pure exchange economy, considering finitely many consumers. Private
commodities to be consumed (or desired) by them are formalized as elements of a vector space (X, ‖ · ‖), which
is assumed to be a real Banach space. This allows one to modelize economies with an infinite-dimensional com-
modity space. Motivations for considering such kind of models, widely recognized in the modern mathematical
economics literature, are discussed for instance in [1] and in some references therein.
Let I = {1, . . . , n} index the consumer set. Each consumer i ∈ I is described in the model by:
• a (nonempty) consumption set Ωi ⊆ X, representing the set of commodities, where consumer i makes her
choices;
• a utility function ui : Ωi −→ R, representing preferences of the consumer i over commodities.
Then, the set
Ω =
∏
i∈I
Ωi ⊆ X
n
defines the social consumption set, where Xn is the n times Cartesian product of X. Its elements are consumption
boundles, denoted by x = (x1, . . . , xn), with xi ∈ X, for every i ∈ I. X
n will be structured as a direct sum,
equipped with the 2-norm ‖ · ‖2. Notice that in this model the happiness of each consumer is affected only
by those commodities that she may consume, not by commodities considered by other consumers. Such a
circumstance is labelled by stating that the consumers have separable utilities. As it is classical in general
equilibrium theory, this excludes strategical interactions between consumers (instead typical in game theory),
focussing on how agents in the economy respond to price systems stimulations.
A vector ω ∈ X denotes the aggregate initial endowment of the model, whereas Θ ⊆ X represents the net
demand constraint. In this setting, a boundle x ∈ Xn is said to be a feasible (or attainable) allocation if
x ∈ Ω and
∑
i∈I
xi − ω ∈ Θ.
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Notice that, in the case in which X is a partially ordered vector space and it is Θ = −X+, the feasibility condition
for allocations becomes ∑
i∈I
xi ≤X+ ω.
Nevertheless, such an order structure on the commodity space will be not required in the present approach.
The feasibility constraint is expressed by means of the mapping c : Ω −→ X
c(x) =
∑
i∈I
xi − ω.
The set A = {x ∈ Ω : c(x) =
∑
i∈I xi − ω ∈ Θ} collects all feasible allocations.
The commodity-price duality associated with the model is indicated by 〈X∗,X〉. This means that the elements
of the dual space X∗ have to be interpreted as prices, so that the value of a commodity x ∈ X at a price p ∈ X∗
is denoted by 〈p, x〉.
The resulting economy is therefore defined by
E = (I, 〈X∗,X〉, (Ωi, ui)i∈I ,ω,Θ).
After the pioneering work of L. Walras, given an economy E , a great amount of quantitative studies on the
principles ruling its mechanism are focussed on general equilibrium theory (historical commentaries can be
found, for instance, in [1, 3, 18]). In this theory, the concept of Pareto optimal allocation and the notion of
equilibrium play a crucial role.
With reference to an exchange economy E , a feasible allocation x¯ ∈ A is said to be Pareto optimal if it is
Rn+-optimal for the vector optimization problem
(POP) Rn+-max
x∈Ω
u(x) subject to x ∈ A,
where u : Ω −→ Rn is the multiobjective mapping that arrays the utility functions of all the consumers, i.e.
u(x) = (u1(x1), . . . , un(xn)).
Notice that, this being the case, the space Rn is partially ordered by the natural componentwise order relation.
Roughly speaking, Pareto optimality for (POP) denotes any feasible allocation, which can not increase the
happiness of any consumer without decreasing that of another one. In this sense, mapping u quantifies the
social efficiency of a given consumption boundle.
The notion of equilibrium is more involved. In the model under consideration (in fact, in many others),
it can not be disjoined from the notion of supporting price, which lies at the very core of the decentralization
mechanism. A price system, in an equilibrium situation, should be able to summarize the informations on relative
scarcities in the given economy; consequently, it can be imagined to induce a distribution among the consumers
of the aggregate initial endowment, according to which each consumer maximizes her utility function over her
budget set, as the latter results from the endowment distribution. More precisely, given a price p ∈ X∗\{0∗},
a distribution induced by p of the aggregate endowment ω among the consumers is any boundle (ωi)i∈I ∈ X
n
such that 〈
p,
n∑
i=1
ωi
〉
= 〈p,ω〉.
It is worth noting that endowment distributions are not uniquely defined by a price system and by the aggregate
initial endowment. The notion of equilibrium can be therefore formalized as follows.
Definition 4.1. With reference to an exchange economy E , a feasible allocation x¯ ∈ A is called a (competitive)
equilibrium if there exists a price system p¯ ∈ X∗\{0∗} that supports x¯, in the sense that all the following
conditions are fulfilled:
11
(i) p¯ ∈ N
(∑
i∈I x¯i − ω; Θ
)
(price positivity);
(ii) 〈p¯,
∑
i∈I x¯i〉 = 〈p¯,ω〉 (market clear condition);
(iii) p¯ induces an endowment distribution (ωi)i∈I of ω, according to which
ui(x¯i) = max
xi∈Ωi
ui(xi) subject to 〈p¯, xi〉 ≤ 〈p¯,ωi〉, ∀i ∈ I, (individual optimality)
with 〈p¯, x¯i〉 = 〈p¯,ωi〉.
In the study of welfare economics, the above two notions appear to be strictly intertwined by two clas-
sical fundamental results, known as first and second welfare theorem. Roughly speaking, under appropriate
assumptions, the first welfare theorem states that every equilibrium is Pareto optimal, whereas the second one
is concerned with the opposite implication (for their first formulation in a modern setting the reader is referred
to [2] and [7]). A critical feature of the original theory is that such achievements can be obtained by making
an essential use of convexity. In the more recent literature devoted to welfare economics, an active research line
revolves around the extension of the second welfare theorem to models of nonconvex economies (see, among the
others, [1, 4, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18]). The reason justifying such an interest has to do with the fact that, as
well recognized in the economic literature, the relevance of convexity assumptions is doubtful, when even not
contradicted in concrete models. A detailed discussion of such difficulty and of various attempts to overcome it
can be found in the references cited above.
In this paper, starting with the same problem, a different perspective on the issue is considered. Trying to
interpret the spirit of local programming, it is shown that, even in the very absence of convexity assumptions,
if properly localized, an exchange economy admits feasible Pareto optimal allocations near a special class of
commodity boundles, here termed regular. If some additional conditions are satisfied, these Pareto optimal
allocations reveal to be equilibria.
4.2 Model assumptions
In this subsection all assumptions, upon which the result next presented in the paper is established, are listed
and discussed.
(A1) The commodity space (X, ‖ · ‖) is supposed to be a uniformly convex real Banach space, whose modulus
of convexity satisfies the quadratic growth condition, and such that (Xn, ‖ · ‖2) fulfils the same property
(remember Remark 2.1(iii)).
(A2) Each consumption set has nonempty interior, i.e.
intΩi 6= ∅, ∀i ∈ I.
This implies the existence of commodities in the consumption set, whose small perturbations in any
direction still belong to the consumption set. Technically, such an assumption is connected with the next
one.
(A3) The utility function of each consumer is a C
1,1 function, i.e.
ui ∈ C
1,1(int Ωi), ∀i ∈ I.
As a comment to such assumption, note that, in the model under consideration, it is implicitly supposed
that each consumer’s observed preferences agree with the behaviour axioms, under which the existence of
an utility function can be derived. The latter being not a primitive concept, one should complement the
analysis of the behavioural axioms, justifying the specific property C1,1 requested on ui. In this regard,
take into account that the assumption on ui to be C
2, often made when dealing with smooth utility
functions, entails in particular (A3). This stronger assumption is discussed in [8].
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(A4) The net demand constraint set Θ is a (nonempty) closed, convex, cone (with apex at 0). Its introduction
allows one to provide a unifying framework for different situations arising in economic models. For example,
Θ may reduce to {0}, when the market clear condition is forced by the model over all feasible allocations.
Otherwise, Θ may coincide with −X+, in the presence of implicit free disposal of commodities. Again, it
may describe situations in which information is incomplete or/and uncertainty enters the economic model.
(A5) The following local qualification condition for the endowment distribution induced by a price system is
supposed to hold: for every x ∈ A and for every p ∈ N
(∑
i∈I xi − ω; Θ
)
, p induces an endowment
distribution (ωi)i∈I among consumers, such that for every ǫ > 0 and for i ∈ I there exists zi ∈ B(xi; ǫ)
with the property
〈p, zi〉 < 〈p,ωi〉.
The above condition says that, near the i-th component of each feasible allocation, any price system
yields a budget set for the consumer i, which contains, among others, commodities not exhausting the
endowment share distributed to i.
(A6) Each consumer i ∈ I is supposed to be locally non-satiated with respect to subsets of Ωi. This amounts
to say that, for every i ∈ I, one has
∀x ∈ Ωi, ∀ǫ > 0, and ∀S ⊆ Ωi, with B(x; ǫ) ∩ S 6= ∅, ∃z ∈ B(x; ǫ) ∩ S such that ui(z) > ui(x).
This last assumption is an enforced version of a well-known condition, usually appearing in model of
welfare economics.
4.3 Regular feasible allocations
In the setting under consideration, the localization approach to the analysis of welfare economics leads to single
out the following class of feasible allocations, to which the next result applies.
Definition 4.2. With reference to an exchange economy E , whose elements satisfy assumptions (A1)− (A3),
a feasible allocation x0 ∈ A is said to be regular if x0,i ∈ intΩi, for every i ∈ I, and D(u, c)(x0) is onto.
Remark 4.1. As an immediate consequence of Proposition 3.2, one has that if x0 ∈ A is a regular allocation
for E , then it can not be a Pareto optimal one for any ǫ-localization around x0 of problem (POP).
When dealing with equilibria of an economy, the notion of problem localization must be somehow adapted.
Namely, given a feasible allocation x0 and n positive reals ǫ1, . . . , ǫn, a (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn)-localization of an economy
E around x0 is the exchange economy defined by
Ex0,ǫ1,...,ǫn = (I, 〈X,X
∗〉, (B(x0,i; ǫi), ui)i∈I ,ω,Θ). (16)
Having done that, one is in a position to formulate the following result.
Theorem 4.1. Let E be an exchange economy satisfying assumptions (A1)− (A4) and let x0 ∈ A be a regular
feasible allocation for E. Then there exists ǫ0 > 0 such that, for every ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0] there is xǫ ∈ A ∩ bdB(x0; ǫ),
which is Pareto optimal for (POPx0,ǫ). If, in addition, assumption (A5) − (A6) hold true and, letting ηi =
‖xǫ,i − x0,i‖, it results in
min{η1, . . . , ηn} > 0,
then such a xǫ is an equilibrium of the localized economy Ex0,η1,...,ηn.
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Proof. Since x0 is regular, it belongs to
∏
i∈I intΩi and D(u, c)(x0) is onto. Thus, under the assumptions
(A1)− (A4), R
n and X being reflexive spaces, it is possible to apply Theorem 3.1, with h, g, Ω and C replaced
by u, c,
∏
i∈I intΩi and Θ, respectively. As a consequence, one gets the existence of ǫ0 > 0 such that, for every
ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0], there exists xǫ ∈ bdB(x0; ǫ) ∩ A solving the localized problem
R
n
+- max
x∈B(x0;ǫ)
u(x) subject to x ∈ A.
The reader should notice that by (A2), without loss of generality, up to a reduction of ǫ0, one can assume that
B(x0; ǫ0) ⊆
∏
i∈I Ωi, and hence B(x0,i; ǫ0) ⊆ Ωi, for every i ∈ I. This prove the first assertion in the theorem.
As to the second one, fix ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0] and note that, along with the existence of xǫ, Theorem 3.1 enables one to
get the existence of (µǫ, x
∗
ǫ ) ∈ (R
n × X∗)\{(0,0∗)}, such that
µǫ ∈ R
n
+\{0}, −x
∗
ǫ ∈ N
(∑
i∈I
xǫ,i − ω; Θ
)
, (17)
and ∑
i∈I
µǫ,iui(xǫ,i) + 〈x
∗
ǫ ,
∑
i∈I
xǫ,i − ω〉 ≥
∑
i∈I
µǫ,iui(xi) + 〈x
∗
ǫ ,
∑
i∈I
xi − ω〉, ∀x ∈ B(x0; ǫ). (18)
Set pǫ = −x
∗
ǫ , let us check that a multiple of pǫ supports the allocation xǫ, with reference to the localized
economy Ex0,η1,...,ηn . According to the position of ηi, it is xǫ ∈
∏n
i=1 B(x0; ηi), so xǫ is a feasible allocation for
Ex0,η1,...,ηn . The positivity of the price pǫ is expressed by the second inclusion in (17). Since in (A4) Θ has been
assumed to be a cone, as noted in Remark 3.1(i), one has also
〈pǫ,
∑
i∈I
xǫ,i − ω〉 = 0, (19)
which is exactly the market clear condition. To show that actually pǫ 6= 0
∗, suppose to the contrary that pǫ
vanishes. From inequality (18), it follows∑
i∈I
µǫ,iui(xǫ,i) ≥
∑
i∈I
µǫ,iui(xi), ∀x ∈ B(x0; ǫ). (20)
Since it is µǫ 6= 0, a proper j ∈ I can be found such that µǫ,j > 0. By virtue of (A6), taking S = B(x0,j ; ηj),
there exists zj ∈ B(xǫ,j ; ǫ) ∩ B(x0,j ; ηj), with the property
uj(xǫ,j) < uj(zj).
Thus, if taking the boundle x˜ defined by
x˜i =
{
xǫ,i, ∀i ∈ I\{j},
zj , if i = j,
it is x˜ ∈ B(x0; ǫ). Indeed, it results in
‖x˜− x0‖ =

 ∑
i∈I\{j}
‖xǫ,i − x0,i‖
2 + ‖zj − x0,j‖
2


1/2
=
(
ǫ2 − ‖xǫ,j − x0,j‖
2 + ‖zj − x0,j‖
2
)1/2
=
(
ǫ2 − η2j + ‖zj − x0,j‖
2
)1/2
≤ ǫ.
Thus, being ∑
i∈I
µǫ,iui(xǫ,i) <
∑
i∈I
µǫ,iui(x˜i),
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one obtains a contradiction of (20). Therefore, pǫ 6= 0
∗. In order to complete the proof, it remains to check the
individual optimality condition. To this aim, let us consider a distribution (ωǫ,i)i∈I of the aggregate endowment
ω among the consumers, which is induced by pǫ, in such a way that
〈pǫ,ωǫ,i〉 = 〈pǫ, xǫ,i〉, ∀i ∈ I. (21)
This can be done, because it is 〈
pǫ,
∑
i∈I
ωǫ,i
〉
=
∑
i∈I
〈pǫ, xǫ,i〉 = 〈pǫ,ω〉,
according to (19). Now, fix an arbitrary j ∈ I. For every zj ∈ B(x0,j ; ηj), any boundle x of the form
xi =
{
xǫ,i ∀i ∈ I\{j},
zj if i = j
still belongs to B(x0; ǫ), as already observed. Consequently, from (18), taking (19) into account, one obtains
µǫ,juj(xǫ,j) ≥ µǫ,juj(zj)− 〈pǫ,
∑
i∈I\{j}
xǫ,i + zj − ω〉
= µǫ,juj(zj)− 〈pǫ, zj − xǫ,j〉, ∀zj ∈ B(x0,j ; ηj).
From the last inequality, in force of the endowment distribution (21), it follows
µǫ,juj(xǫ,j) ≥ µǫ,juj(zj)− 〈pǫ, zj − ωǫ,j〉, ∀zj ∈ B(x0,j ; ǫ). (22)
Notice that µǫ,j must be positive. Otherwise, it would be
〈pǫ, zj − ωǫ,j〉 ≥ 0,
so the arbitrariness of zj would contradict the existence of zˆj ∈ B(x0,j ; ǫ) ⊆ Ωj such that
〈pǫ, zˆj〉 < 〈pǫ,ωǫ,j〉,
which is guaranteed by virtue of the local qualification condition (A5). Thus, the positivity of µǫ,j enables one
to obtain from (22)
uj(xǫ,j) ≥ uj(zj), ∀zj ∈ B(x0,j ; ηj) such that
〈
pǫ
µǫ,j
, zj
〉
≤
〈
pǫ
µǫ,j
,ωǫ,j
〉
,
what means that xǫ,j is optimal for the consumer j ∈ I over her budget set. Since the positivity condition and
the market clear condition are both invariant with respect to the multiplication by positive scalars, one can take
as a price system supporting xǫ the functional p¯ǫ = pǫ/µǫ,j. This completes the proof.
It should be clear that Theorem 4.1 is not a generalization of the second welfare theorem to an exchange
economy model affected by non-convexities. What it states is rather different. First of all it is an existence
result. More precisely, it speaks about the behaviour of an exchange economy near its regular feasible allocations,
provided that this economy is localized as in (16). Of course, any such localization modifies the geometry of the
problem, with the result of yielding the existence of Pareto optimal allocations. The second part of the thesis,
which is valid under additional assumptions, qualifies the above Pareto optimal allocations as equilibria.
As in many recent generalizations of the second welfare theorem, also in Theorem 4.1 some convexity
assumption is dropped out: in fact, utility functions are merely supposed to be C1,1. The convexity of the net
demand constraint set is maintained (in the cases Θ = {0} and Θ = −X+, such assumption is automatically
satisfied), because the price system supporting an equlibrium is still obtained by means of the linear separation
theorem. This is evidently in contrast with many of the aforementioned generalized second welfare theorems,
which rely on a nonconvex separation technique (see [10, 13]) due to J.M. Borwein and A. Jofre´ or on the
so-called extremal principle due to B.S. Mordukhovich (see [15, 16, 18]).
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